Navigating Change and Nuclear Policy Challenges

Focus: SPA Perspectives

Navigating Change and Nuclear Policy Challenges

Author: Tom Troyano, SPA Fellow for Nuclear Modernization

Alexandria, VA | May 21, 2025

Given the long-term implications of nuclear modernization, maintaining strategic continuity through political transitions is essential for national security. Tom Troyano, SPA’s Fellow for Nuclear Modernization, navigated seven Presidential transitions during his 28-year tenure with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His perspective highlights why bipartisan consensus is indispensable to a credible and resilient nuclear deterrent.

“It has to be a bipartisan effort,” Troyano emphasizes. “The only way to convince Russia and China of U.S. seriousness is a bipartisan consensus in favor of a stronger nuclear deterrent.”

Addressing Urgent Nuclear Threats: Insights from the Strategic Posture Commission

Troyano notes that the United States is facing an unprecedented strategic challenge. Assumptions about the global environment that drove nuclear modernization decisions in the 2010 timeframe have turned out to be overly optimistic. The United States, he says, faces a very different – and deteriorating – strategic environment.

Troyano highlights the 2023 report from the Strategic Posture Commission (SPC), a bipartisan body appointed by Congress. The Commission’s 12 bipartisan members unanimously described threats facing the United States over the next decade as “urgent,” characterizing them as an “existential challenge for which the nation is currently ill-prepared.

Among the challenges identified by the SPC are the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, the need to address a significantly larger set of targets now that “the Chinese nuclear threat is no longer a lesser included case,” and the increasing risk of potential simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia that would likely involve kinetic and non-kinetic attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Rethinking Nuclear Modernization: Is the Current Approach Enough?

In examining nuclear modernization programs established over a decade ago, the SPC concluded those original plans were “necessary but not sufficient” to address the emerging strategic environment. The SPC stated the U.S. nuclear force may need to be larger, different in composition, postured differently, or all three.

Troyano underscores that these recommendations raise critical follow-on questions that must be addressed for informed policy decisions. Key questions include:

What additional strategic capabilities, beyond the current modernization program of record, will be needed to address future threats—and when will they be needed?
While matching adversaries’ combined arsenals is unnecessary, how many additional uploaded missiles are needed? How many additional Columbia-class submarines, Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, B-21 bombers, and airborne refueling tankers—will be required, and in what timeframe?
What critical enabling capabilities will be needed for the deterrent (e.g., NC3 systems, non-nuclear components, supporting infrastructure)?
How should the “overhaul” of the nuclear enterprise infrastructure be approached to balance modernization needs with delivering capabilities already scheduled under current programs?

A Roadmap for Decisive Action and Bipartisan Consensus

To address these critical issues, Troyano anticipates the administration will move swiftly to perform the detailed analyses necessary for implementing the Commission’s recommendations. Doing so will help build a sustainable, bipartisan consensus for the future on what will be “sufficient” to ensure deterrence.

He proposes leveraging the SPC’s findings and recommendations with four key actions:

Implement Nuclear Enterprise Transition Management
Develop a comprehensive, enterprise-wide effort to deliver capabilities included in the current Program of Record (POR), ensuring timely delivery of the new systems and maintaining legacy systems until replacements are available. This requires persistent, senior-level leadership attention

Formulate a Strategic Roadmap
Create a detailed roadmap informed by rigorous analyses of threats, operational needs, technological maturity, and feasibility. This roadmap will clarify what additional nuclear force capabilities—in terms of quantity and composition—are required for strategic and regional deterrence and help prioritize decisions.

Strengthen the Nuclear Deterrent Industrial Base
Address unique requirements of the nuclear deterrent’s industrial base and workforce by developing a specific plan including critical materials, supply chain security, technical education, and vocational training. Assign execution responsibility to a designated senior official.

Establish High-Level Oversight Forum
Create a high-level transition management forum dedicated to prioritizing nuclear deterrence efforts, providing rigorous analytical support to decision-making, and ensuring effective execution. Additionally, establish a parallel forum to oversee the nuclear weapons complex.

Troyano emphasizes that these steps require national will and focused, prioritized attention. He notes the technical, fiscal, and other challenges ahead that may make it difficult to accomplish what is proposed here. But to meet this challenge, it is necessary to change the “business as usual” mindset to one that focuses on the importance and urgency of the task at hand.

“We need more senior leader involvement with the nuclear enterprise…so that the enterprise can move faster, while still providing the analytic rigor needed for key decisions and to continue a bi-partisan consensus.”

SPA Fellow for Nuclear Modernization, Tom Troyano

Beyond modernization, an immediate challenge looms with the expiration of the New START Treaty in February of 2026, necessitating proactive strategic planning. Troyano emphasizes, “Given the expiration of New START in 2026, the U.S. should identify post-New START objectives now.”

He outlines these issues that should be considered in this assessment:

How Russia (or the U.S.) could exploit the absence of NST-like limits
If, and when, additional weapons might be needed
The implications of entering any new agreement, even if just politically binding, that constrains the U.S. while China visibly builds to a force of ~1500 warheads
Identification of measures that could strengthen strategic stability in light of adversary developments on new kinds of delivery systems

SPA’s Role in Strengthening U.S. Nuclear Deterrence

SPA’s nuclear deterrence analysis capabilities, integral to its Strategy, Policy, and Doctrine expertise, provide government leaders with comprehensive strategic insights and actionable analysis, bridging high-level policy with real-world operational outcomes.

“Just as during the Cold War, investing in innovation and demonstrating decisive leadership in fielding a “sufficient” deterrent are essential. SPA is committed to ensuring senior leaders have the analytical rigor and strategic foresight required to keep adversaries from gaining the advantage.”

SPA Fellow for Nuclear Modernization, Tom Troyano

Troyano also points out that the Nation has faced severe threats and tackled tough questions in the past and can do so again. It will require continuing, difficult discussions on what is needed, what is possible, and how challenges can be overcome, with a sustained willingness to consider options outside the normal programmatic and funding constraints.”

SPA is up for supporting the challenge.

Learn how Tom Troyano is helping to shape SPA’s future nuclear analysts.

Read more about SPA’s capabilities in developing strategies and analyses for nuclear deterrence.

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